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THE EFFICIENCY WAGE HYPOTHESIS, 
SURPLUS LABOUR, AND THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF INCOME IN L.D.C.sl 
By JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 
ONE of the 'paradoxes' of developing economies is the coexistence of 
unemployment with a positive (although low) wage for hired labourers. 
Two resolutions of the paradox are commonly offered: (a) There really is 
no unemployment. (b) Markets are not in equilibrium, possibly because of 
institutional constraints on the level of wages offered. In the rural sector, 
these 'institutional constraints' take the form of 'communal pressure' 
rather than minimum wage legislation. This paper is concerned with 
exploring a third alternative explanation, the efficiency wage hypothesis. 
The hypothesis dates back at least to the work of Leibenstein,2 and there 
have been some theoretical investigations of its implications. This paper 
is concerned with the consequences of the efficiency wage hypothesis for 
the distribution of income in the rural sector and considers the effects of an 
increase in rural population on rural output and inequality.3 
The economics of the rural sector-the allocation of labour, the supply of 
effort, the determinants of migration from the rural to the urban sector, 
etc.-depends critically on how the sector is organized; for instance, 
whether farms are individually owned or whether there are extended 
families, whether there is a large landless peasantry, whether individuals 
who migrate to the urban sector lose their rights to the land, etc.4 
In this paper we consider several polar cases: 
(a) The output-maximizing farm. 
(b) The plantation farm, which maximizes rents from the land. 
(c) The egalitarian family farm, in which income is divided equally 
among its members. 
(d) The utilitarian family farm, which maximizes family social welfare. 
1 This paper was originally written while the author was a research fellow at the Institute 
for Development Studies, University of Nairobi (1969-71) under a grant from the Rocke- 
feller Foundation. This work was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant 
SOC 7422182 at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford 
University. The author is indebted to his colleagues at the IDS for many helpful discus- 
sions: in particular, he would like to thank G. E. Johnson and L. Smith. The author is also 
greatly indebted to J. F. Wright for comments on an earlier draft. 
2 H. Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, 1957. 
3 In another paper, 'Alternative theories of wage determination and unemployment in 
L.D.C.s: the efficiency wage model', we explore the implications of the hypothesis for 
shadow prices in the urban sector. 
4 For a more extended treatment of these issues, see J. E. Stiglitz, 'Rural-urban migration, 
surplus labor, and the relationship between urban and rural wages', East African Economic 
Review, Dec. 1969. 
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186 THE EFFICIENCY WAGE HYPOTHESIS 
Several striking results emerge:' 
(i) There are important conflicts between equity and efficiency: the 
output in the egalitarian farm may be significantly lower than in the 
output-maximizing farm. 
(ii) For sufficiently poor farms, complete equality may not be feasible. 
(iii) Maximization of family welfare may entail some degree of inequality. 
We are able, however, to establish certain bounds on the degree of 
inequality. In particular we can think of each individual's receipts 
as his marginal product plus a pro rata share of rents. The low-wage 
individuals are less efficient han the high-wage individuals; they 
receive less than their share of the rents pro-rated on the basis of 
percentage of the population, but more than their share of the rents 
pro-rated on the basis of percentage contribution to total effective 
labour supply. 
(iv) The social marginal product of an individual is negative in the 
egalitarian and utilitarian farms: as individuals migrate from the 
rural sector, output actually increases. 
(v) In the plantation economy, working individuals have a positive 
marginal product, and receive a wage equal to that marginal pro- 
duct; but there may be considerable unemployment. This is an 
equilibrium; that is, the unemployed are unable to bid down the 
wages of the employed. The wage they receive is identical to that 
of those individuals who work in the output-maximizing farm. 
The implication of (iv) and (v) is that the presence of a positive wage (and 
a corresponding positive marginal product) for working individuals in a 
competitive labour market cannot be taken as evidence that labour is not 
in surplus (as some authors seem to have done). 
(vi) Raising a dollar from the rural sector, even by a lump sum tax or a 
land tax, reduces income in the rural sector by more than a dollar. 
The paper is divided into two sections. Section 1 presents the basic model 
and compares the first three kinds of farms. Section 2 analyses the utili- 
tarian farm. 
1. Output-maximizing, egalitarian, and plantation farms 
The efficiency wage hypothesis says that the services a labourer renders 
are a function of the wage he receives. One well-paid worker may do what 
two poorly paid workers can do. We let A(w) be the index of efficiency of a 
worker receiving a wage of w. 
1 The exact conditions under which these results obtain are spelled out in the subsequent 
discussion. 
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We hypothesize further that A has the shape depicted in Fig. 1. There is 
a region of increasing returns, where as the individual is brought above the 
'starvation' level additional increments in wages result in increasing 
increments in efficiency, although eventually diminishing returns set in. 
Although many observers have claimed that the efficiency curve has the 
w I I* IV 
FiG. 1. The efficiency curve. 
shape depicted, direct empirical evidence is hard to come by and it remains 
a moot question. It should be emphasized that our results do depend 
critically on the existence of the initial region of increasing returns.' 
By reversing the axes of Fig. 1, we obtain in Fig. 2 an alternative inter- 
pretation of the efficiency wage curve: the wage required to obtain a given 
number of efficiency units from an individual. As a result we shall refer to 
this as the wage-requirements curve. 
Certain points on the efficiency wage curve play an important role in 
the subsequent analysis. Let 
w 
the wage cost per efficiency unit. Then 0 is minimized when 
1 A,O :r 
A A 2 
or A'(w) - A(w) (1.1) 
The solution to (1.1) is often referred to as the efficiency wage, and will be 
denoted by w*, with 0* w*/A(w*). 
1 We do not wish to discuss here the direct empirical evidence in support of and against 
this hypothesis. We shall note, however, that the model does correctly describe many 
aspects of the labour market in L.D.C.s. 
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188 THE EFFICIENCY WAGE HYPOTHESIS 
The value of w at the point of inflection of the efficiency wage curve we 
denote by Wz. 
The limiting value of 0 for small levels of w, i.e. the wage per efficiency 
unit required to produce very small levels of efficiency, we denote by 0. 
0 lim W (1.2) 
w-+o A(w)( 
In Fig. 3, we have depicted the production function for the farm. Output 
in the representative farm in the rural sector is a function of the input of 
W Q 
/gslope = Ok 
al(W*) 2 E 
FIG. 2. The wage-requirements curve. FIG,. 3. The production function. 
labour services, land, capital, and other factors of production. In this 
paper, we focus only on labour; all other factors of production are assumed 
to be fixed in the short run.' 
Let E represent the total number of efficiency units supplied on the farm, 
and let Q represent output. Then we represent he production function by 
Q = G(E) (1.3) 
where G' >, O. G' < 0; there is a positive marginal product and diminishing 
returns to labour. 
Let L be the total number of available workers on the farm. Thus wL 
is the total wage requirement for obtaining A(w)L efficiency units (when 
all individuals are paid the same wage). This is plotted in :Fig. 4. The 
straight line OE* represents the minimum food requirements for obtaining 
a given number of efficiency units, for A(w)L < A(w*)L. This is obtained 
I Most of our results will still be true in the more general case where these other factors 
are allowed to vary, as they certainly will in the long run; our primary interest here is in 
the short run analysis (rather than with capital accumulation, or intersectoral capital 
movements) and hence the assumption of other factors being fixed may not be unreasonable. 
In any case, the more general analysis would obfuscate the simple points we wish to establish 
here. 
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190 THE EFFICIENCY WAGE HYPOTHESIS 
by providing a fraction of the workers with a wage of we and the remainder 
with nothing. The 'convexified' wage requirements curve (the straight 
line OE*) we shall refer to as the 'non-egalitarian wage requirements curve' 
to distinguish it from the 'egalitarian wage requirements curve' (the curve 
OE*). 
Considerable insight into the problem is obtained if we superimpose the 
wage-requirements curve (essentially Fig. 2) on to the production function 
Fig. 3, as is done in Fig. 4. 
The output-maximizing, plantation, and egalitarian farms may now be 
easily described. (Each of these farms is assumed to have a given amount 
of land.) 
(a) Output-maximizinq farm. The output-maximizing farm finds on the 
production function the highest point that is feasible, i.e. that is not below 
the wage-requirements curve; it is, in other words, the highest intersection 
of the non-egalitarian wage requirements curve with the production 
function. We shall refer to the maximum output as Qmax and the corre- 
sponding wage as Wmax. 
(b) Plantation farm. A plantation farm in a competitive economy would 
maximize its rents, taking the minimum wage, iv-, at which it can obtain 
labour as given: max [G(LA(w))-wL] (1.4) 
{L,w} 
SAt. w >_wiv. (1.5) 
Let us denote the equilibrium wage for this economy by wp (and the corre- 
sponding output by Qp). The equilibrium involves two possibilities depend- 
ing on whether at w w*, L =L 
G'(LA(w*)) <wit 
(i) If G'(LA(w*)) > w*, at the efficiency wage there is excess demand 
for labour. Hence in equilibrium 
wp > w*. 
The equilibrium wage is given by 
G'(LA(wP))A(wP) wf, (1.6) 
i.e. the slope of the production function equals the wage cost per effi- 
ciency unit (0). The distance between the output curve and the curve 
(w/A(wP))E S OE gives the rent. Thus EP > E* is the point where the 
rents are maximized, when the competitive wage at which labour can be 
obtained exceeds the efficiency wage w*. 
(ii) If G'(LA(w*)) < we at the efficiency wage, there is excess supply of 
labourers. Then 
wp = w 
and L<L: 
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there is unemployment. Thus, the constraint (1.5) is not binding; even if 
workers were willing to work for almost nothing, their efficiency would be 
so low that it would not pay firms to hire them. 
Equilibrium employment is given by 
G'(LA(w*))A(w*) W*. (1.7) 
The slope of the production function equals the slope of the non-egalitarian 
wage requirements curve. Thus (wp, LP) maximizes rents, the distance 
between the output and the non-egalitarian wage requirements curves. 
There is one objection which may be raised to this analysis. If the reason 
for the efficiency curve is, at least partially, nutritional rather than psycho- 
logical, and the workers on the plantation share their income with non- 
working or poorer relatives, the landlord will reap, through the increased 
efficiency of his workers, only a part of the benefits of paying high wages. 
In the subsequent discussion, we shall ignore this possibility., 
(c) Egalitarian farm. The egalitarian farm divides the total output 
equally among its members, i.e. 
e ( Lt ( 1.8) 
The solution to (1.8) is simply given by the intersection of the wage- 
requirements curve and the production function, and will be denoted by 
(We, Qe). 
There are several possible configurations. 
The configuration in Fig. 4a we refer to as the very rich economy, to 
distinguish it from the next three cases which we shall refer to as the rich, 
the poor, and the very poor economies. The essential feature of the very 
rich economy is that Q Qe> Qv5 ma 
We > WV WmaxZWe>Wp >W*. 
The output-maximizing and egalitarian farms are identical, and have a 
higher output and wages than the plantation farm. The wage on the 
plantation farm in turn is higher than the efficiency wage. 
Fig. 4d represents the very poor economy. The wage-requirements curve 
is everywhere above the output curve; complete egalitarianism-the 
same wage to all workers-is not feasible. Notice, however, that the dotted 
line OE* does intersect the output curve, so, with some inequality, the 
economy is viable. Qmax is now found as the intersection of dotted OE* 
with the production curve, and entails a fraction of the population being 
unemployed, and the remaining fraction receiving a wage of w*. The 
1 For a more extended discussion of its implications, see J. E. Stiglitz, 'Alternative theory 
of wage determination and unemployment in L.D.C.'s: II. The efficiency wage hypothesis', 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 357, Mar. 1973. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.62.83 on Thu, 2 May 2013 15:03:45 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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plantation farm maximizes rents at Q., where the slope of the production 
function is equal to the slope of dotted OE*. Thus the plantation farm and 
the output-maximizing farm differ not in the wages they pay, but only in 
the number of individuals they hire. 
Fig. 4b depicts the rich economy, in which in the plantation farm system 
there will be unemployment, even though full employment at a wage 





Finally, Fig. 4c depicts the just poor economy in which both the com- 
pletely egalitarian farm and the plantation farm have lower outputs 
than the output-maximizing farm; the plantation farm and the output- 
maximizing farm both pay the workers they hire the efficiency wage, but 
the output-maximizing farm hires more workers. The egalitarian farm has 
an output which lies between Qmax and Qp. 
These results suggest that although for rich economies there is no trade- 
off between output and equality, for the poor economies ('poor', 'very poor') 
there is such a trade-off. 
The nature of this trade-off may be seen more clearly by considering 
what happens if we impose a minimum wage which all individuals must 
receive. In Fig. 5 we have denoted this minimum wage by wmin. Assume 
we wish to maximize the output given that all individuals receive a wage 
W > Wmin, 
From Fig. 5, it is clear that for small wmin the solution entails a lower out- 
put than Qmax but a higher output than Qe, the output on the egalitarian 
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farm, and that the wage received by the high-paid workers WH is lower than 
the efficiency wage but greater than w. As we increase wmim, we lower output 
and reduce inequality. Eventually, for high enough wmjn (and in particular 
for wmin > wZ'), output is maximized when all individuals receive the same 
wage. 
If we think of WH-Wmin as a measure in inequality, then we can 'plot' 




plotted indifference curves between output and inequality. A family which 
had a low degree of inequality aversion might pick a point such as E1 in 
Fig. 6, entailing an output near the maximum feasible output, while a 
family with a strong aversion to inequality would pick a point such as E2 
in Fig. 6, near the egalitarian farm. 
It should also be clear from Fig. 5 that in some circumstances, everyone 
can be made better off by the introduction of some inequality, i.e. there may 
exist a feasible pair of wages (Wmin, wH) such that WH > Wmin > We. 
Several other results emerge neatly from this diagrammatic analysis. 
First, observe that there may be multiple equilibria for the egalitarian farm; 
the family has a low income, so it has low productivity; and because it has 
low productivity, it has a low income (Fig. 7). 
Secondly, consider the question of the cost of raising funds from the rural 
sector, say for investment in the urban sector. For simplicity, we consider 
only the egalitarian family farm. Assume the government imposes a lump 
sum tax on the farm. This is equivalent to a uniform downward shift in 
the production function. See Fig. 8a. Even in the rich farm, the loss in 
income in the rural sector exceeds the revenue raised by the government. 
(Similar results obtain for a proportional output tax, as Fig. 8b illustrates.) 
O.E.P. 2 0 
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194 THE EFFICIENCY WAGE HYPOTHESIS 
Next, consider the effect of an increase in population. This shifts the 
wage-requirements curve proportionately upward and to the right, as 
depicted in Fig. 9a. (Obviously, the efficiency wage remains unchanged.) 
The effect on output for an egalitarian farm can be seen clearly from the 
Production/ 
function 
age requirements curve 
FIG. 7. Multiple equilibria. 
_C: iTax a U 0 011 Cd C Tax 
/~~ 
FIG. 8a. Effects of taxes. FIG. 8b. 
diagram. If the wage in the economy had sufficiently exceeded the 
efficiency wage, then output increases, but if the wage had been lower than 
the efficiency wage, output is reduced. Thus, for farmns which are sutfficiently 
poor that we < w*, the social marginal productivity ofa labourer i~s negative.' 
For small changes in L , if we > w*, then the social marginal productivity of
1 This argument is very different from that presented by Stiglitz, 'Rural-urban migra- 
tion . . .', op. cit., and A. K. Sen, 'Peasants and dualism with or without surplus labor', 
JPE 74 (Oct. 1966), 425-50, where the social physical marginal productivity may be nega- 
tive because with reduced population, workers work harder, and output actually may 
increase. 
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ivL 
FiG. 9a. Change in labour supply. 
wL Wage-requirement curve 
technical After technical 
change change 
v*L Si, Production W  Q 
Q~ Q~naQe-' Q function 
FIG. 9b. Technical change. 
a Tabourer is positive. To see this, we take the logarithmic derivative of ( 1.8) 
to obtain dlnw G'L / A'wdlnwI 
I+dlnL- G + A dlnLj 
i.e., recalling that E A(w)L, 
dIn G dIn G dIn E d In OldInS A + I- 0 (A'w/A)) ,
dlnL dlnE dlnL dlnE L 01(A'w/A) < 
as A'w/A < 1, i.e. as we ' w* (using (1.1)) where ox G'E/G, the imputed 
share of labour, i.e. the share of labour if marginal productivity pricing 
were used.' 
It should be clear, however, that although the social marginal produc- 
tivity of a labourer in the rural sector is negative, the apparent 'private' 
1 Since d ln w/d ln L = -( 1- o)/( l-( A'w/A)) < O, andof < 1, it is clear that cA'w/A < 1. 
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FIG. 9c. Techniques chosen on egalitarian and plantation farm differ. 
wL B 
A 
w.4 L - - - - 
El E2 L() 
Fie.. 9d. Mixtures of techniques. 
marginal productivity, G'A, is positive. Each person is contributing some- 
thing on the margin to production. It is only the fact that his presence in 
the rural sector decreases the income per capita, and hence the productivity 
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of the other workers in the rural sector, that makes his social marginal 
productivity negative. 
For an output-maximizing or a plantation farm, in which previously 
there had been unemployment, there is no effect on output; the extra 
individual simply is added to the unemployment pool. 
Next, consider the effect of a technical change which shifts the A(w) 
curve. In Fig. 9b we have depicted a case where the efficiency of a worker 
at each wage is increased proportionately so the efficiency wage is un- 
changed. This increases the equilibrium wage on the egalitarian farm, but 
leaves the wage on the plantation or output-maximizing farm unchanged. 
On the output-maximizing farm output is increased and employment is 
increased,' but on the plantation farm, output is increased, but employment 
may be reduced. (In the limiting case where C is not differentiable at the 
original situation, a small 'neutral' technical improvement will leave the 
effective labour unchanged, and hence will reduce employment propor- 
tionately.) 
On the other hand, there can be other kinds of technical improvements 
which increase the efficiency wage a great deal but have a relatively small 
impact on the cost per unit effective labour; such a technical change will 
actually reduce the level of employment. 
There are important differences between the farms in the choice of 
technique. A plantation farm (when there is unemployment) chooses 
whatever technique minimizes w/A regardless of its effect on employment. 
A technical change which reduces w*/A(w*) will always, however, lead 
to an increase in output. On the other hand, the egalitarian farm will 
adopt an innovation if it reduces WeIA(We). Fig. 9c illustrates a case where 
WeIA(We) is increased although w*/A(w*) is reduced. 
Finally, note that if two techniques can be combined, the minimum wage 
requirements curve appears as in Fig. 9d. For efficiency units between 
E1 and E2, a fraction of the labour force is employed on technique A, at 
a wage wA greater than wA, the efficiency wage of technique A, and 
the remaining labour force is employed using technique B, at a higher wage 
WB which is greater than wB. 
2. Maximization of family welfare 
2.1. The problem 
In the previous section, we noted a trade-off between output on the family 
farm and 'equity'. One way of 'capturing' the family trade-off between 
1 Since G' > 0, OQmaxIOE < OQnaxIOE'. But the employment ratio in the initial situa- 
tion is OQmaxIOE and in the final situation is OQMax/OE'. 
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equity and efficiency isfor the family to maximize a family welfare function. 
Let V(w) be the utility associated with an income of w. We wish to find' 
max J' V(w) dP(w) (2.1) 
where P(w) is the percentage of the family workers receiving at least a wage 
of w,2 subject to the constraint that 
G(f A(w) dP(w)) f wdP(w), (2.2) 
output equals income. 
2.2. The main propositions 
We are able in the analysis below to provide a fairly complete charac- 
terization of the above problem. 
(a) If, when income is equally distributed, labour is in surplus (i.e. its 
marginal product is zero), or if the economy is very rich, so that a wage in 
excess of the efficiency wage is feasible, or if the family is very inequality 
averse, then there is a single wage: the solution to the utilitarian problem is 
given by the egalitarian wage (e.g. 1.8). 
The remainder of the analysis is concerned with characterizing those 
solutions which entail inequality. We let w1 be the highest, w2 be the wage 
paid to the next lower group, w1 > W2 > W3 .... 
(b) The highest wage paid is less than the efficiency wage, but greater 
than the inflection point-wage (w). This is as expected, since although an 
extra dollar to this group contributes more to productivity, it contributes 
less to 'utility' since there is diminishing marginal utility. There is a unique 
wage in excess of the inflection wage. 
This can be seen in Fig. 10, with wages wl > w2 > W. Clearly by paying 
a wage between w1 and w2, output would increase and so would equality. 
A similar argument cannot be made for wages less than W. Indeed, 
1 It is obvious that if V is linear, i.e. V(w) = a+bw, then maximization of (2.1) is equi- 
valent to maximizing W 
which, by (2.2), is equivalent to maximizing G(E), family output. If V(w) is of the form 
-w-P, then maximizing 
'~~~~~~~ - W-P dIPMW 
is equivalent to maximizing [ J w-P dP(w)] -/P 
and in the limit, as p -? oo, this approaches 
min w. 
For economies which are not 'too poor', we obtain the completely egalitarian solution of 
Section 1, where everyone receives his average product. 
The integral is best interpreted as a Stieltjes integral. 
2 In most of the subsequent discussion, we shall let P(w) take on any values between zero 
and one; obviously, if there are L individuals in the family, P can only take on values 
1/L, 2/L, etc.; the slight loss in realism is more than compensated for by the gain in analytic 
tractability. 
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increasing inequality increases effective labour supply, so that with only 
a slight degree of (local) inequality aversion more than one wage less than 
w will be paid. For simplicity, in the subsequent discussion we will assume 
there is a unique wage less than W. 
Decrease in effective Increase in effective 
labour supply from labour supply from { 
W3 elimination of elimination of 
inequality I { | inequality 





FIG. 11. Utility function with low inequality aversion for w < W. 
We can obtain a more precise bound on w1: given the level of wages paid 
to the lower group (w2), we showed in the previous section there was a level 
of wages, which we denote bywH*, paid to the upper group which maximizes 
output. We can show that, for sufficiently large L, 
w < w < wH* <w*. (2.3) 
As we decrease the upper wage below wH*, aggregate output decreases, but 
inequality also decreases, and in the utilitarian calculus we are always 
willing to make some sacrifice in aggregate output for an increase in equality. 
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(Analytically this follows from the fact, established in the appendix, that 




while wH* is that wage for which 
1 w-w2 \ 
A'(W) A(W)-A(W2)7 




0 AL AIL E 
FIG. 12 
B A(w1) B 2.a 
(c) A( ) a,+ < W, A( ) '+ A~wl) + (1-p)A(W2) Lo (24) 
A(wA(G2)a + A(W2) B (2.4b) 
> w2> 
+pA~w) +(I p)A(w2)L 
where R G- G'E, the implicit rent on the land, and p proportion of 
population receiving a high wage. The income received by any individual 
can be thought of as consisting of a wage payment, equal to his marginal 
productivity, AG', plus a share of the rent, R. Individuals in the more productive 
group receive more than a proportionate share of the rent. On the other hand, 
they contribute more to output. They receive less than their proportionate 
contribution to output. 
This result may be seen diagrammatically as follows. In Fig. 12 let 
A and C represent the two wages actually paid, and B the output (B lies 
on the production possibilities schedule). H is generated by extending OB 
on until E A L; F is generated by extending the tangent to the produc- 
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tion function. Since R C- G'E, letting ) pA(w1)-(1-p)A(w2), we 
can rewrite (2.4a) as 
G + '()v1 A) < w, < L+ (A(w) -)E 
Since w2 > 0, it is clear that (w1 G/L)/(A1-A) < G/E, i.e. the slope of 
ABC is less than that of OBH, from which the second inequality follows. 
The first inequality follows from the fact that the slope of ABC is steeper 
than that of the production function at B (otherwise there clearly exists a 
feasible point which dominates B). 
(d) dG < 0. (2.5) 
The social marginal productivity of a labourer in the rural sector is 
negative, i.e. increasing the number of workers in the rural sector reduces 
output. 
(e) dw1 > 0, dw2 < ? (2.6) dL E dL 
As L increases, and output falls, inequality in the rural sector increases: 
w1 increases while w2 decreases. Equality is a 'luxury' of the well-off. 
2.3. On the number of wage levels paid 
To see the relationship between the different wages paid to different 
individuals, consider two groups, with wages w1 and w2. Consider the 
experiment of giving one person at a wage of w, one more unit. The effective 
labour supply goes up by A'(wj). This does not take away one full unit from 
the resources available to other groups, since output will go up now by 
G'A'(w1). Hence, for product exhaustion, we need to take away net, say 
from a group with w2 wage, an income of 1- G'A'(wj). Each unit we take 
away gross leads to a reduction in effective labour supply by A'(w2) and of 
output by G'A'(w2). Hence the net revenue is 1- G'A'(w2). Thus to increase 
the wage of a person receiving a wage of w1 by one unit, we must reduce the 
wage of a person receiving a wage of w2 by 
1- G'A'(w1) 
1- G'A'(W2) 
The gain in social welfare from increasing the wage of a person receiving w 
by a unit is V'(w). Thus we require for welfare maximization 
V'(w1) - 1-G'A'(w2) V'(w2) 
for all wl, w2 actually paid, i.e. 
V'(w) = constant (2.7) - GAl a(W) 
for all w actually paid. 
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(2.7) is plotted in Fig. 13. The logarithmic derivative of (2.7) is 
VW+1-G/A (2.8) 
The first erm is always negative, the second is positive for w < w-, negative 
for w > wP.1 Accordingly, for w > w, (2.7) is declining, establishing that 
there can be only one wage level in excess of wi. As w approaches zero, (2.7) 
approaches a positive infinite level, provided 
lim V'(w) -o 
Wv2 a WI W` 
FIG. 13. Wage determination in family welfare maximizing farm. 
(marginal utility becomes infinite as w goes to zero), since under our 
assumptions concerning the efficiency curve, 
lim A'(w) -? E > 0. 
Moreover, as w -+ co, (2.7) approaches zero, if 
lim V'(w) 0 
and if lim A'(w) 0, 
we .00 
i.e. there is a maximum attainable level of efficiency. 
For 0 < w < wi, there may be any number of local minima or maxima; 
for instance, in Fig. 13, there are three wages at which V'/(1 - 'A') equals 
the particular constant represented by the dotted line. 
2.4. Reformulation of utilitarian problem 
Assuming now that there are no more than two wage groups, we can 
reformulate our problem to read 
max (pV(w1)+ (1-p)V(w2))L (2.9) 
1 Assuming G'A' < 1. Obviously, for all wages actually paid, G'A' < 1; otherwise there 
is no 'revenue' cost at all in raising the wage. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.62.83 on Thu, 2 May 2013 15:03:45 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
J. E. STIGLITZ 203 
subject to 
L(pwl+(1-p)W2) = G((PA(W1)+(1 p)A(w2))L). (2.10) 
p is the proportion of the population in the upper group. 
0 p < 1. 
The first-order conditions are simply 
V'(wi)+v(G'A'-1) = 0, i = 1,2, (2.11) 
V(wl)-+v(G'A(wl)-w,) = V(w2)+v(G'A(w2)-W2) (2.12) 
where v is the shadow price associated with the constraint (2.10). 
2.5. Proof that high wage is less than the efficiency wage 
To see that w1 < w*, we multiply (2.11) by wi and subtract the result 
from (2.12) to obtain 
(V1- Vwl)- (V2- V2W2) = vG'[(A2-A'2w2)-(A1-A'1w1)] (2.13) 
where V1V(w1), A1 A(w1).... 
Since d(V- V'w)/dw = V"w > 0, the left-hand side of (2.13) is positive, if 
w1 > w2. For w less than the efficiency wage w*, A' > A/w, so A > A(W2)/W2. 
Hence A1-A wl < 0 if the right-hand side of (2.13) is to be positive, i.e. 
A'(w1) > A(w1) 
Wi 
w1 must be less than the efficiency wage. 
2.6. Conditions for egalitarian solution 
This result, together with our earlier analysis, enables us to ascertain 
under what conditions there will be only one wage. 
(a) If there is only one wage, it is clearly given by the highest value of w 
satisfying G(A(w)L) wL. 
If the solution is greater than w*, the efficiency wage, clearly all individuals 
are better off in that solution than in the 'solution' with inequality, where 
w2 < w1 < w*. In effect, when the economy is very well off, there is no 
trade-off between efficiency and equity, so maximization of family welfare 
involves complete equality. 
(b) On the other hand, when the economy is very poor, i.e. if G' 0, the 
marginal productivity of labour services is zero; then of course again there is 
no trade-off between equity and efficiency; as (2.8) makes clear, V'/(1 - 'A') 
is a monotonically declining function of w so again there is only one wage: 
everyone receives his average product. 
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If workers get paid their average product, we have established in Section 1 
that dE 
dL' 0 as L < L* 
where G(A(w*)L*) = w*L*. 
Hence E < E*-) A(w*)L*. 
We have thus established that a necessary condition for inequality to be 
optimal is that L> L* (2.14) 
Even in these situations, if the degree of equality preference (as measured 
by -V"/V' or -V'w/V')1 is sufficiently great, then again workers will 
receive their average product.2 Our concern in this section is with the 
behaviour of families when the degree of equality preference is sufficiently 
weak that the gains in total family income induce them to give different 
members of the family different incomes.3 
2.7. Further bounds on wage payments 
To establish (2.4), we let Si equal the amount by which the wage exceeds 
the marginal product: Si w--G'AX. (2.15) 
We can rewrite (2.12) then as 
= Vl 2 (2.16) SI-S2~~~~~I 
But pS1+(-P)S2= R (2.17) 
where R/L is the 'rent' (G- G'L) per capita. Substituting (2.17) into (2.16) 
we obtain 1)(V 1 V2) R R 
S2 P~g Vl+ < v L L 
On the other hand, the more productive contribute, on a per capita basis, 
more to output. If they were to receive income proportionate to their 
contribution to output, they would receive an amount 
A1 ( 
pA1-+(1-p)A2 Lo 
1 For a discussion of the use of these as measures of degrees of equality preferences, see 
A. B. Atkinson, 'On the measurement of inequality', Journal of Economic Theory, 2 (1970), 
244-63. 
2 That is, V'( 1 -G'A') will then be a monotonically declining function (see equation (2.8)). 
3 It is clear that what is crucial is the sign of V"/V' relative to A", the degree of 'increasing 
returns' to wages. 
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The difference between what the first group receives and its proportionate 
contribution to output is 
p A1A (pw?(1-p)w2) = (1-p)wlw2 A2 _A < 0. pj+(1 -p)A2 pA + (I1-p)A2kW2 WI) 
Similarly 2 pA1- (l-p)A1 (PW1+(1 P)W2) > o. 
The final two propositions come from straightforward (but tedious) 
differentiation of the first-order conditions for welfare maximization (see 
Appendix). 
Concluding comments 
We have analysed the implications of the efficiency wage hypothesis for 
the rural sector. We have shown how it can lead to a true surplus of 
labourers, even though all employed labourers receive a positive wage. 
This result has very strong implications for shadow prices of labour in the 
urban sector. Indeed, if this argument is correct, then the opportunity cost 
of hiring one labourer from the rural sector may be negative. A fuller 
investigation of the implications for shadow prices must, however, await 
another occasion. 
APPENDIX 
Proof that dw,/dL > 0, dw2/dL < 0, dQ/dL < 0. 
The family's optimal decisions are described by the four equations in the four 
unknowns, w., w2, p, and v, and the parameter L. 
V'(w1) + v(G'A'(wl)-1) = 0 (A.1) 
V'(w2)+v(G'A'(w2)-1) = 0 (A.2) 
-V2+V(CT'(A1-A2)-(W1-W2)) 0 (A.3) 
G((pA1 + (1 -p)A2)L) - (pwI + (1 -p)w2)L = 0. (A.4) 
Totally differentiating, we obtain (after some simplification) 
-(1+a1) -1 -1 -bl- pAdw- 
I- -(l+a2) -' -b2 |(1P)A2dW2] = [pA+(1p)A]dlnL 
L -b2 0~~~~~ J (Al-A2)dP] LI L- bl -2 -C 0 dv -1 e1 
where I7~~~v+vG'A` where a i i;+ >0 O. i= 1,2 
bi Aj ~ > O. i=1,2 A>V2G"L 
C (Ai--A2)v2G"L> 0. 
G-G'E 
[pA1+( 1-p)A2vGT"L2 
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To ascertain the signs of the various derivatives, we shall need to know the sign of 
e-c, bl-c, and b2-c. 
VI - V2 G-G'E c 
eV(AIA2)(PAI+(I-P)A2)L 
=G'+WIw2 G-G'E (using A.3) 
1l- 2 E 
w1-w2 pwI+(1-p)w2 (using A.4) 
W1-W2 A1-A2 
W2 A2 
W1 W2 < 0. (since w2 < wI < w*) (A.5) Al A2 
Vi V1-V2 
I -c Al-A2 
_ = V (_W2-G' (using A.3) 
= 1- V;( 1(-W )AliA2) CT) (using A. 1) 
I__11w-w 
= 1- G'AlAA1-A2) (A.6) 
But from the concavity of V (see Fig. 14a) 
V1-V2 > V'(wL)(wl-W2). 
Hence V1' -VI V2 <V'(' W1- W2 (A.7) AHn A1-A2 < Al A1-A2( 
But (A.6) and (A.7) together imply 
I1 1 _ 1W2) < V' -Wl-W2) 
1G7Al\A A' -A I lA' Al-A2 
i.e. since, from (A.1), G'A'(w,) < 1, 
1W-2< o. 
AI A1-A2 
Thus bl-c < 0. 
Similarly, b -c A V2 V A1-V2 2 
A2' Al-A2 
1 V'A2(Aa A1-W2 ) (A.8) 
But from concavity of V 
V1-V2 < V'(W2)(Wl-W2)- 
Hence V2V1-V2 > V-I 'w). (A.9) 
A2' Al -A2 A2' Al -A2 
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FIG. 14b 
(A.8) and (A.9) imply 1/A2-(wl-w2)/(Al-A2) > 0, so 
b2-c > 0. 
Then dwL a2(e-c)(c-bl) > 0, 
dW2 
a,(e-C)(c-b2) < Os 
Finally, 
dinE lf I'r dw1/ i2 p 
d ln L 1AI +S+ ( 1-p)A2[A1 d ln L+ (1-P)A2 d~nL d~nL a da+ e) d 0. 
ed aa2 C(C -e) < O. 
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